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Zusammenfassung
Axel Hägerström war der große schwedische Schulbildner mit Einfluß auf
Juristen, Philosophen und Sozialwissenschaftler; darüber hinaus wird eine
ganze Generation von Politikern in intellektueller Abhängigkeit von ihm
gesehen, vielen gilt er gar als der Theoretiker des modernen schwedischen
Staates in seiner etatistischen, sozialdemokratischen Wohlfahrtstradition:
Sein Kampf gegen die Metaphysik und seine Kritik an naturrechtlichen
Vorstellungen wurde grundlegend für den skandinavischen Rechtsrealismus
und hatte zudem großen Einfluß auf die schwedische sozialdemokratische
Ideologie, den sogenannten Funktionssozialismus. Die Uppsala-Schule des
Rechtspositivismus ist von seiner antiidealistischen Auffassung von der
Setzung der Moral durch Macht geprägt, doch trotz des seinerzeit großen
Einflusses ist Hägerström über die Grenzen Schwedens hinaus kaum noch
bekannt.
Sven Eliaeson is a docent in political science at Stockholm’s University
and frequently visiting scholar to German and American universities.
Time and again polemics over Axel Hägerström (*1868, #SYMBOL#1939)
and the role of his value philosophy erupt in Swedish dailies, as well as
among professional philosophers and other scholars.
Hägerström’s basic notion is that there is no science in morals, merely on
morals.1 This bold statement has always generated criticism. In Sweden this
criticism ranged from the Marxian scholar Arnold Ljungdahl to the
educationalist and philosopher John Landquist. The latter coined “Nihilism” as
an originally pejorative label for Hägerström’s philosophy, a label which soon
was proudly accepted by its adherents as its proper name, although it in
addition often is defined as the emotive theory of values.
There is not much written on Hägerström in international encyclopaedias of
philosophy. However, if there is one Swedish philosopher who should be
represented in such Pantheon, Hägerström would be the obvious choice, as
exemplified in Blackwell’s Dictionary of Philosop2.
Hägerström was professor of Practical Philosophy at Uppsala and his
inaugural lecture from 1911 “Om moraliska föreställningars sanning” is not
only central for the understanding of his works, but also an important albeit
neglected piece in the history of ideas and of social science doctrine.
This is the first time a negative value ontology is explicitly launched in a more
precise and comprehensive manner, even if David Hume as well as Occam
might be seen as forerunners to the radical antimetaphysics developed by
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In his personal Uppsala-life Hägerström has a certain resemblance to
Immanuel Kant’s Königsberg-life. He seldom left Uppsala and did not travel
to international conferences. He was a “house plant”, deeply attached to his
wife and daughters. He belonged – like many Swedes of his generation – to
the German Kulturkreis in the widest sense. His voluminous dissertation on
Kants Ethik im Verhältnis zu seinen erkenntnistheoretischen
Grundgedanken systematisch dargestellt (more than 800 pages) was
written and published in German, as was his main mature work, Der
Römische Obligationsbegriff (two volumes). He also wrote his
autobiography in German (published by Felix Meiner in Leipzig in 1929) in
the series Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen.
Hägerström grew up in a deeply religious home in Östergötland (his father
was a Lutheran minister) and it was a shock to his parents when young Axel
declared that he had decided not to study theology and become a priest. In
fact, much of Hägerström’s antimetaphysics must be seen in a context,
where atheism as well as radicalism and secular (scientific) orientation
replaced theology. This deep belief, combined with an expressed sense of a
true calling could partly explain Hägerström’s obvious selfconfidence. In fact,
he regarded his own thinking as a Copernican revolution in philosophy.
Among Hägerström’s contemporaries Hans Kelsen, Max Weber, and the
Finlandian anthropologist Edvard Westermarck developed similar ideas,
imprinted by anti natural law and radical antimetaphysics. They were rather
independent of each other even if they seem to have been aware of each
others work.
There is no intellectual biography written on Hägerström, except for a rather
slim volume by his daughter.3 His ideas have been spread mainly by his
followers in jurisprudence, the so called Scandinavian school of legal realism.
The Professor of Law at Lund Karl Olivecrona’s Law as Fact4 which soon
became an international textbook has been translated even into Japanese,
and through the Uppsala Professor Vilhelm Lundstedt, who made a parallel
political career as a social democratic senator, Hägerström’s thinking would
eventually exercise considerable influence on social democratic policy in
Sweden. Actually, Lundstedt could be seen as an important figure for
understanding some specific traits in Swedish political culture and its relative
disregard of natural rights. Hägerström’s ideas have a certain affinity to
American pragmatism (John Dewey, Oliver W. Holmes, Roscoe Pound) and
neo-pragmatists (Richard Rorty) as to continental European thoughts, for
instance the œuvre of Niklas Luhmann, where the function of law rather than
its normative validity is in focus. The transition from jus to lex was in itself no
novelty. We find it in British utilitarianism, especially in the works of Thomas
Hobbes and Jeremy Bentham. The question is: what comes first? Law or
justice? To a legal positivist concepts like “right” or “wrong” are only
meaningful within a defined positive legal order. To a proponent of natural
law on the other hand, there is some sort of transcendental system of norms
behind like the ten commandments, which we are supposed to try to obey,
and the law to codify. Also to many legal positivists there might be a system
of norms behind the law but this should be understood as remaining traits of
metaphysics, residuals of natural law thinking. These lingering elements of
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his pupils loved to criticise (like Hägerström in his polemics against various
theories of the free will as a legal source). This is a parallel to Gunnar
Myrdal’s critique of the value bias in doctrines of economics and it is a
crucial key to the understanding of why legal positivists and nihilists seemed
to disagree, even if their basic approaches evidently had a very strong
affinity. On one occasion Hägerström and Kelsen actually met for a debate in
Uppsala but they were evidently unable to understand each other.
Hägerström is still with us. Even if he is now and then declared “dead and
buried” the corpse is still “twinkling”. The recurrent “obituaries” are
themselves in fact proof of his confirmed presence and the virulence of his
thought, which is not yet fully incorporated into the body of social thought,
despite the fact that he addresses precisely the central topics on the
postmodernist agenda.
There is no particular “Hägerström School” of philosophy. In this sense he
reminds us of Max Weber. Hägerström had pupils but more so in
jurisprudence and theology5 than in professional philosophy. There is also
something self-dissolving in his philosophical position which in a way marks
the end of philosophy as traditionally understood. Hägerström’s philosophy is
“victorious to death”. Hägerström just like Max Weber formulates very strong
basic positions which remain virulent since they tend to be accepted by
almost everybody, although without a due recognition of the source. They
are even “embraced” – unwillingly – by the opponents. Hence, one does not
become a Hägerströmian because it is a neat and nice position, but rather
because there is no intellectually honest alternative except for the Icarian
flights of well meaning but hardly convincing “backdoor normativism”.
Hägerström offers irreversible insights of postenlightenment and his ideas
are like the cave of the lion, many footprints leading in and none out. Today
die-hard pre-enlightenment natural law thinking is not really taken seriously
and it has to fall back on revealed truth, like in the case of Leo Strauß and
his followers. Others, like Alisdair MacIntyre, instead try to reconnect to
Aristotelian foundations in their search for firm norms – but are actually
wrestling with, and not overcoming, the problem of value incommensurability
which is so central to Hägerström and which codifies the most tragic insight
of postenlightenment, generating the necessity and anxiety of choice which
we associate with the names of Friedrich Nietzsche and Søren Kierkegaard
(and today in social science maybe with Anthony Giddens and Zygmunt
Bauman).
I have not seen any valid criticism of Hägerström, except for some rhetorics
about semantic details where Hägerström was less sophisticated. The
Uppsala philosopher Ingemar Hedenius misses the point in his criticism of the
so called Hägerström-Lundstedt error, which is, moreover, notoriously
misunderstood. Hedenius maintains that at least some normative
“non-genuine” statements about “right” or “wrong” should after all mirror a
tacit reality and thus have a truth value, as basically cognitive statements (if
they are understood as such), and hence have a scientific meaning-content
and could be judged as true or false. To the Hägerströmian all such
statements lack such a cognitive meaning since they are not statements
about reality, more than let us say a sneeze or a cough. They are thus
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interpretation where the debate still goes on.) Hedenius’ position that
Hägerström’s plea for a non-cognitivistic value sentence theory only applies
to genuine statements about “right” or “wrong” and not some utterances that
only on the surface seem to be such statements although they actually do
refer to reality appears to me as trivial – and above all, does not at all – not
even in the view of Hedenius himself – alter Hägerström’s basic position
(which he shares). It is a sort of empathic criticism which aims at improving
rather than refuting, although it has been misunderstood by many, e.g.
Theodor Geiger (see below).
Hedenius is just as much anti natural law as Hägerström and his basic point
that non genuine sentences about “right” or “wrong” might have a truth
content (since they are statements over something else than they appear to
be sentences about) and thus after all have a scientific truth content, is
something altogether different from ascribing truth value to genuine value
sentences and on that crucial point Hedenius and Hägerström are of one
mind. In my view the Uppsala philosopher Konrad Marc-Wogau6 is right in
his assertion that Hedenius’ criticism is trivial and in full accordance with
Hägerström’s point. Vilhelm Lundstedt, nevertheless, dedicated a whole
series of lectures to an aggressive rejoinder against Hedenius.
It is not by chance that two prominent intellectual refugees in Sweden –
Ernst Cassirer and Theodor Geiger – both have written books on
Hägerström.7 Geiger basically echoes Hedenius but overestimates the
scope of his own criticism. He wishes to “improve”
Hägerström’s antimetaphysics. He seems to believe that his criticism should
alter Hägerström’s positions but I simply cannot see that this is the case.8
Geiger himself writes that: “Personally I declare myself for value-nihilism and
antimetaphysics”.9 But alleged errors in Hägerström’s sociological
foundations in Geiger's view somehow make his philosophy invalid, which to
me appears both as unproven and even as flawed argumentation.
I find it frustrating to read Hedenius and Geiger. They are crystal clear as
long as they elaborate and explain Hägerström’s position but both become
very abstruse and opaque when they try to develop their own criticism.
Hägerström might have had his limits and flaws as a semantic and as a
sociologist – but his basic philosophical points remain firm and unaltered.
In some respects Hägerström discusses parallel themes with Friedrich
Nietzsche. The slogans “Beyond good and evil”, “Der letzte Mensch“ and
“Death of God” come to mind, as unifying themes for Hägerström, Nietzsche
and Weber. In “Beyond Good and Evil” Nietzsche wrote: “There are no moral
phenomena at all, only a moral interpretation of phenomena”.
The existential anxiety of choice is thus a predicament we can not escape.
We have today new possibilities to recast our lives, as Anthony Giddens
phrases it. But choice is also a necessity and there are no firm authorities to
rely on; we are on our own.
The death of God is both an expression in Nietzsche and a label for the
Enlightenment. God is dead and there are several churches. We would love
to have the firm values that our instrumental means-end-analyses require but
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to choose. We thus have to postulate our ultimate goals, in a situation
imprinted by polytheism or perspectivism. This should – which Hägerström
also pointed out – rather generate a certain humbleness on behalf of various
Weltanschauungen and their political parties. Ideological fanatics in
postenlightenment are faced with a lack of credibility, when they try to invoke
“Ormus vs Ariman” or various crusade ideologies time and again, while on
the other hand ugly and less civilized ideologies cannot be refuted by
scientific means – or neither proven, nor refuted.
There is yet another – and more vulgar – connection to Nietzsche, namely
the view of laws and norms as merely fences to control the “domesticized
cattle” of ordinary people, fences which the more supreme individuals can
disregard – since they have no morally binding force. We are here close to
the double morals of Machiavelli. Historically it is obvious that laws have the
advantage of making our actions predictable. This is what modern trade and
commerce require and the purpose which modern laws (in contrast to
feudal) fullfill, ever since the so called papal revolution 800 years ago. It is
tempting to ascribe conventions about what is “fair” in a specific culture a
guise of moral objectivity, regardless its validity. As the colourful Bishop
Anton Niklas Sundberg in Karlstad said, when theologians debated the
existence of the devil and hell a century ago: “We still need a hell for the
peasants, don’t we?” Hägerström himself did not share any
Übermenschenideal, his contribution is to claim that we have to reconcile
with a polytheist predicament which in his view would promote tolerance and
countervail ideological value rational fanaticism. It might sound cynical that
moral convictions are matters of civility and cohesiveness, legitimacy and
belief systems in different cultures, rather than matters of absolute truth and
validity – but anyone actually pleading the validity of norms carry the burden
of intersubjective proof.
The loss of firm norms makes us unhappy, insecure, and without orientation.
The new ideologies of the 19th Century were all children of the
enlightenment and could be seen as secular religions – but they pointed in
different and competing directions.
Of course, natural law and Christianity remain viable alternatives but after
the enlightenment their claim of a monopoly no longer had any credibility.
They were reduced to optional alternatives in the market place of ideas but
without a privileged position. The philosophical basis for the validity claim on
behalf of natural law had been eroding ever since the 13th century,
accelerated by the contributions of Machiavelli, Hobbes and Bentham. To
Bentham notions about right or wrong were fictitious entities and he
characterized natural law as nonsense on stilts.
We have no scientific means at our disposal to decide the architecture of the
“Good society”. Modern social engineering is more parochial (Lokalvernunft,
the historian and anthropologist would say) although it rests on Western
values, with universally increasing relevance in modernity and modern
capitalism.
There are signs that Hägerström’s personal allegiances were much in the
tradition of French radicalism, e.g. Émile Zola, and he was himself a radical,
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His most prominent pupils took very different political positions; Lundstedt as
a social democrat imprinting Swedish political culture and Olivecrona
exposing himself to accusations of Nazi-sympathies, which might very likely
be an overstatement. But as late as 1943 he hoped for a German victory in
the Second World War. He wrote books in which he said that if Germany
were to lose, Europe would be dominated Russia and America, two young
warrior nations much inclined to control European natural resources. After
the war he admitted that he had overlooked the ideological factor.
There are several overlaps between Hägerström and the continental
European thinkers he never really met, above all Max Weber, whose ideal-
type-methodology indeed could be characterized as polytheist or
existentialist, anchored in the philosophy of the neo-Kantian philosopher
Heinrich Rickert. But there are also affinities to Ernst Troeltsch and his
analysis of the crisis of historicism. According to Troeltsch values vary with
culture and the crucial question then is how to accomplish objective values.
The core of historicism – the denial of eternal laws and norms – seemingly
promoted relativism and anti-natural-law modes of thinking.
There are admittedly problems of interpretations here. Rickert has been
called the father of historical relativism, yet relapsed into notions of eternal
suprahistorical values. Weber was more consequent on this point, although
leaving the limits of science an open question; we cannot say for sure where
the infinite process of science must hold its horses in the future. Hägerström
is more radical. To him values lack truth content, while in the case of Weber
we rather do not know if they do.
Hägerström’s combination of a negative value ontology and a
non-cognitivistic value sentence theory is the most radical position – as well
as a very strong one. It is also a position that readily makes us feel uneasy.
It is easy to see some nasty consequences an “overspill” from science to
social attitudes, resulting in moral indifference and moral deficit, promoting a
“community” filled with antisocial “free-riders”. To quite some extent that is
what we have today which is also reflected in modern political science
(Robert Putnam and the communitarians, like Michael Sandels and
Amitai Etzioni).
However, the validity of Hägerström’s position is hard to challenge, and the
consequence of his position should not be mixed up with its validity. It is a
position difficult to escape – with preserved intellectual honesty and without
employing some wishful thinking – even if we would like to. There is nothing
charming about Hägerström’s position. But all attempts at refutations I have
seen have the character of another “Indian rope trick” or backdoor
normativism. Everybody wishes to challenge “relativism” and “nihilism”, none
ever succeeded. It is a bit like the dog barking at the moon.
The Swedish economist and sociologist Gunnar Myrdal operationalizes
Weber’s solution to the problem of identifying norms serving as basic values
in our rationalized hierarchies of means-end-rationality. Weber has resolved
the normsender problem by using the notion of culture. The values were to
be identified, that could fill in for the Wertobjektiven, the validity of which we
simply cannot verify, but which we still need for our Wertbeziehung (value
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and relevant values, i.e. values that could serve as guidelines for unions and
parties and other important actors in society. This we might call a more
political or instrumental version of Weber because, being a German, he
relied more on university professors or charismatic leaders as interpreters or
innovators of values to “jump on”.
Gunnar Myrdal was explicitly influenced by both Weber and Hägerström and
his approach is paradigmatic for today’s policy science.10 He practises his
approach for instance in An American Dilemma11 where he at length
elaborates on the values serving as useful points of departure, despite the
fact that there is no way to prove their normative validity. They are
indispendable but have to be made explicit in order to avoid uncontrolled
value intrusion.
One might say that Myrdal, a powerful and influential analyst but hardly an
innovative thinker, does to Weber and Hägerström what Samuel Pufendorf
once did for Hobbes, i.e. contributes to the diffusion of their basic thoughts
to a wider readership.
There is admittedly a danger that Hägerströmianism might lead to an
identification of might with right, power with justice. As a small homesteader
I like to invoke Lockean concepts of property, in my defence against the
populist state power and – the Swedish – so called functional socialism that
places the common good before individual rights in its imposition of new
Draconian taxes, on firewood from my own forest or whatever. Alas, I
cannot prove my viewpoint, I can only embrace, plead and act as if it was
true and valid. To the individual a constitutional order is a nicer arrangement
than full fledged mass democracy, as Helmut Schelsky once said. The same
goes on the larger scale for human rights in general and to a
Hägerströmian the UN charter might be the manifestation of a growing
civilization etc, but not “true”. It is merely a subjective opinion, with a purely
ideological status.
The Swedish-Finlandian scholar Harry Järv once wrote that “it is not true that
all men are born free and have equal rights and human value, as is stated in
the UN charter. There is no theoretical foundation for such a statement.
Laws and conventions are artefacts with sometimes positive and sometimes
damaging consequences. It is, nevertheless, possible to act as if the UN
charter is the truth; and undoubtedly, it would be beneficial to mankind to do
so.” I fully agree.
Thus the small independent forest owner must be prepared to claim his
independence and his natural rights against other powers – and then he
needs to cooperate with other citizens in a similar position, to protect his
rights. In this process he is incorporated in a positive order, a community,
with positively defined rights and obligations. It is a rational trade off. One
buys one’s security, by sacrifising parts of one’s independence. The escape
from the anarchy of the state of nature has its price. In the old Wild West the
lone pioneer moving on westwards might be the hero – but the Homestead
Act, the colt revolver and the barbed wire built civilization and communities
with cohesiveness and civility. This answers well to the transition from a
Hobbesian state of everybody’s war against everybody, into a system of well
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which others decide and one has to obey. This is more pronounced in
Bentham, to whom jus is replaced by lex, i.e. the law has priority over
“justice”. Lex can be found in legal praxis as expressed in the court
decisions, while it remains unclear what jus really is. It is harder to achieve a
consensus about jus than lex, although communicative Utopianism à la
Jürgen Habermas – and originally Socrates – seems to recure. They seem
to be well meaning but they still have the same flaw as Rousseau’s Volonte
generale: how to deal with dissenters?
Hägerström was the prophet and Olivecrona and Lundstedt his apostles.
The Danish scholar Alf Ross also contributed to the diffusion of the
Scandinavian legal realism. To Ross the law is like traffic rules; it is simply
practical to agree which side of the road to drive on – and how to implement
sanctions if bills are not paid, property stolen, relatives killed, etc.
Hägerström himself liked to portrait the belief in law as a moral thing as
magic (and superstition), the roots of which he tried to trace in several of his
works.
Again I think, Hägerström is right – but I also recognize that the seamy side
of Hägerströmianism is less visible in a small and homogeneous peasant
society like Sweden than in, let’s say Belgium or Bosnia. There is no reason
to allow relativism and nihilism to expand from a purely philosophical position
to become a life-style dominated by indifferent attitudes – but such
“overspread” easily happens. On the other hand, the dangers of totalising
ideologies organized in Weltanschauungsparteien seem to be a more urgent
problem in recent history. Hägerströmian „nihilism” is neutral and provides no
guidelines for our conduct of life.
Hägerström has a high degree of omnipresence but yet an underutilized
potential in modern social thought. This is partly due to tensions within the
Uppsala school of philosophy itself.12 Several younger anti-metaphysic
philosophers distanced themselves from Hägerström (Vienna and Oxford
philosophy being additional sources of inspiration) and would only reluctantly
and somewhat unwillingly admit that Hägerström was the most original
philosopher.13 To some extent we might also sense a condescending attitude
among philosophers to practioners in the field of social science.
Hägerström’s Nachlaß, some 25.000 pages of unpublished manuscripts, is
kept at the Carolina Rediviva in Uppsala, while the collected works of his
intellectually less important colleague Adolf Phalén has been published.
Hägerström’s influence is manifested in many ways. In Sweden his imprint is
manifest both in the political culture and in literature. The difficulties to
harmonize Sweden to European legal praxis as regards constitutional rights
for the individual against the state can be traced to Hägerström and
Lundstedt. This general cultural influence is well documented by
Staffan Källström.14
It seems to me as a national feature of certain significance that
Scandinavians have an obvious taste for being either number crunchers or
dark anti-metaphysics, often positivists, as a sort of inverted “Lutheranism” –
and when they do jump on ideals they do so rather fanatically, like the
Swedish-American scholar Georg Lundberg, who like Auguste Comte late in
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market in Sweden, since the downfall of Boströmian idealism a century ago
(which was more a Swedish “Hegelian” ideology for the state officials than a
proper philosophy).
At least in the case of Lundstedt it seems that Hägerströmianism was an
almost religious conversion, where the vacuum in ethical norms somehow
was substituted in a typical and slightly paradoxical manner by “public
welfare”, to which the individual was subordinated. Lundstedt was a colourful
scholar who in the League of Nations in Geneva and other fora preached
that the idea of international law in the normative sense was a danger to
peace and international cooperation.
In a longer perspective Hägerström carries coal to the same fire of
secularization as Machiavelli, Hobbes, Bentham, Weber, and Myrdal.
Anti-natural law and calculability are core elements and rational economic
man the central metaphor. The gradual demise is already embryonic in
Thomas Aquinas and further promoted by Pufendorf, who in his days was
accused of “Hobbesianism”, used as a synonym to atheism. It is strange that
the victory of natural rights (as codified in written constitutionalism) coincide
with the erosion of natural law.
For more than a millennium political philosophy dealt with the intentions of
God and the route to salvation – and the worldly societies being a
preparation for the eternal sacred life or at least Doomsday. Pufendorf
worked in the aftermath of the 30-years-war and his project was to
elaborate the demarcation between “sociology” (civil society) and theology,
so we do not have to become deadly enemies already over confessional
topics, like the holy trinity. In the process society (ordered peaceful
coexistence between citizens, claiming by Man defined rights and
obligations) becomes a goal in its own right.15
Hägerström’s ethical realism (a problematic term since it to the American
probably would indicate the opposite position, - natural law – rather than
legal positivism in the European sense) touches upon matters of legitimacy
and contingency, which is a sinister and central theme from Machiavelli, via
Hobbes, to Weber, Parsons – and Carl Schmitt. The Norwegian scholar
Rune Slagstad16 has analysed this particular tradition in his work on liberal
constitutionalism.
Hägerström is also basic for understanding the slogans Death of Ideology –
after Fukuyama’s End of History – and Beyond Left and Right17. The
enlightenment resulted in competing ideologies and norm systems and the
weakening of religion. This creates a market for tracking down normative
elements contributing to uncontrolled value intrusion in social science. To
both John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx their theories dealt with both what is and
what ought to be; the gulf between the two became explicit through Weber,
Hägerström, and Myrdal. The 19th century is mixed and the discourses on
how to organize and how to explain society intertwined. Hägerström – and
his parallel classics – changed this and created the predicament we now
have. We might label this the predicament of modernity, and if that is so
postmodernism would just appear as a school of thought that only belatedly
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1 “Science has only to indicate what is true, while it is nonsense to
regard the idea of obligation as true”, and further, “moral philosophy as a
science is purely and simply a science of actual moral evaluations in their
historical development, based on a psychological analysis and conducted
by a critical philosophical investigation of the ideas which are operative
therein.... Moral science may not be a teaching in morals, but only a
teaching about morality”, as he writes in his inaugural lecture from 1911.
2 Mautner, Thomas (Ed.): A Dictionary of Philosophy. Oxford 1996.
3 Waller, Margit: Axel Hägerström. Människan få kände.
Stockholm 1961. See also Jes Bjarup: Reason, Emotion and the Law.
Studies in the philosophy of Axel Hägerström. Aarhus 1983, diss. at the
University of Edinburgh. This book, though, is almost apocryphal and hard
to find.
4 Olivecrona, Karl: Law as Fact. 2nd ed., London 1971 (1st ed. 1939).
5 Especially in Lund theologians (Anders Nygren) took impression which
lead to a new understanding of the relation between science and faith as
supplementary rather than alternative approaches.
6  Marc-Wogau, Konrad: Studier in Axel Hägerströms filosofi.
Uppsala 1968.
7  According to Krois at the Humboldt-Universität, working with the
Cassirer Gesamtausgabe, Hägerström was a formative influence to
Cassirer (personal conversation fall 1997).
8  Eliaeson, Sven: „Geiger, the Upsala-School of Value-Nihilism – and
Weber.” In: Fazis, Urs u. Jachen C. Nett (Hg): Gesellschaftstheorie und
Normentheorie. Theodor Geiger Symposium. Basel 1993 (=
Monographien zur Soziologie und Gesellschaftspolitik, Vol. 25), 225–34.
9  Geiger, Theodor: Debat med Uppsala om moral og Ret. Lund /
Copenhagen 1946, 17.
10  This is evident in an article Myrdal wrote in Ekonomisk Tidskrift in
1931 – but also further supported by his unpublished “memoirs” kept at
Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv in Stockholm. I would like to thank
Stellan Andersson, who kindly put this “apocryphal” material at my
disposal. The intentional depth of any influences on Gunnar Myrdal
remains a problem for further inquiry.
11  Myrdal, Gunnar: An American Dilemma. The Negro Problem and
Modern Democracy. New York / London 1944.
12  Nordin, Svante: Från Hägerström till Hedenius. Lund 1984. See also:
Eliaeson, Sven: „Review of Svante Nordin:
Från Hägerström till Hedenius.“ In: Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift. 87 (1984),
no. 4, 372–79.
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Hedenius, Ingemar: „Minnen av Adolf Phalén“. In: Filosofisk Tidskrift. 1
(1980), no. 1, 24–34.
14  Källström, Staffan: Den gode nihilisten. Axel Hägerström och
striderna kring uppsalafilosofin. Stockholm 1986.
15  Pufendorf, Samuel: On the Duty of Man and Citizen.
Cambridge 1991.
16  Slagstad, Rune: Rett og Politik. Oslo 1987, especially the chapters 3
and 4 on “Liberalismen og dens machiavelliske kritikere: Schmitt, Weber,
Olivecrona” and “Rettens legitimitet”.
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